Dependence, not causation
Frequently on this blog I say things like the following: If you hadn’t opened this post, then almost certainly humans would never have existed. I admit that such statements can sound ludicrous. I’ve devoted many posts, and most of a book, to explaining why the statements are true even if they seem outlandish at first.
Determinism implies that earlier conditions counterfactually depend on later conditions. For any time t, if the conditions at t had been different from what they actually are, then the conditions at all earlier times would have been different too. Physics adds that this dependence is exceedingly sensitive.
But determinism doesn’t imply that later conditions cause earlier conditions or that earlier conditions are a consequence of later conditions. That would be reverse causation. Some of my statements may have seemed outlandish if you took me to be endorsing reverse causation. I never have.
This distinction matters to the moral evaluation of actions. Suppose I commit some misdeed. Determinism and physics jointly imply that if I hadn’t committed that action, then humans almost certainly wouldn’t have existed. But that doesn’t mean the existence of humans is caused by, or a consequence of, my action. So I can’t excuse my misdeed by citing the existence of humans as one of its effects ‒ let alone an effect I intended! Nor does the counterfactual dependence imply that my action violated no moral duties, or that actions like mine generally maximize utility, or that my action showed virtue. So my action remains morally criticizable on the usual grounds.
