Bottomless reality
Reader Paul Beke kindly answered my call for comments and questions on anything I’ve written on this blog or in my book. Paul asked about section 4.4 of my book. There I argue that the universe must be ontologically bottomless, having no smallest metaphysical substance, no smallest nonzero mass or volume, and no shortest nonzero duration. Any smallest substance, mass, volume, or duration would lack an explanation for its existence, in violation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
According to my argument, underlying any physical thing there must be some other physical thing with less mass and volume, and so on without end. Thus, there can’t be any “fundamental particles.” While the Standard Model of particle physics includes nothing smaller than quarks and leptons, it by no means follows that nothing smaller exists. After all, Bohr’s model of the atom didn’t include quarks, yet quarks exist. No one thinks the Standard Model is the last word about particles.
In my book, after rebutting objections to the possibility of an infinite ontological regress, I concede that “trying to picture a bottomless universe can induce something like intellectual vertigo” (p. 120). Paul asks about overcoming the vertigo. I myself picture entities getting smaller and smaller to a vanishing point, like the space between railroad tracks viewed from a distance. Beyond the vanishing point, I don’t see the railroad ties that I know exist just as the ones I do see. Likewise, the ever-smaller entities in the regress exist despite my inability to picture them all. Moreover, the alternative ‒ a universe resting on finitely deep ontological “bedrock” ‒ is even harder to imagine: I can’t help picturing the bedrock as either standing on something more basic or somehow “standing” on empty space.
Paul asked other questions that I’ll try to answer in my next post. Please keep the questions and comments coming!
