Retrospective regret
In section 5.6 of my book, I argue that purely retrospective regret, just like purely retrospective relief, is rationally indefensible. At least if we assume values that are anything close to typical. If you regret, all things considered, that some event E occurred, then you assume that things would have been better, all things considered, if E hadn’t occurred. Determinism and the laws of physics challenge that assumption.
You’re driving again, and another pedestrian darts in front of your car. This time, however, you don’t avoid hitting the pedestrian; you run him over. Determinism and the laws of physics imply that if you hadn’t run him over, then almost certainly no humans would ever have existed. If you prefer, on the whole, that humans have existed rather than not, then you’re committed to preferring, on the whole, that you ran him over.
Which is not the same as preferring that you run people over! On the contrary, if you’re allowed to drive again, you should use the accident as a spur to drive more carefully. If you can’t stand any risk that you’ll hit another pedestrian, you can quit driving altogether. Determinism allows ‒ indeed, encourages ‒ the rational prospective use of an attitude whose purely backward-looking version is irrational. Doggedly forward-looking, determinism emphasizes our power over the future. It puts a premium on learning and applying what experience teaches us.
I’ve presumed that you hold typical values ‒ such as preferring that humans have existed even with all the pain that human existence imposes. If you hold untypical values, that launches a different discussion that I plan for a future post.
