Predictability and free will
My last post argued that you can’t perfectly predict our deterministic universe unless your grasp of the prior conditions is infinitely precise and error-free. No finite being can possibly have such a grasp. Even an infinite, inerrant being must interact with our universe to get the information needed to predict it. That interaction itself generates yet more information needed for perfect prediction. And so on.
Let’s ignore those obstacles and imagine a deity who magically gets information about our universe without affecting it. On that basis, the deity perfectly predicts our future. So what? What threat does predictability itself pose to free will? Humans are already predictable to a significant extent. I predict that you’ll choose to read this entire sentence. I was right, wasn’t I? Yet no one thinks that my prediction diminished your free will at all. I didn’t coerce you into reading it. I just correctly predicted that you would choose to read it.
Even if an infallible deity predicts your future, you make free choices as long as the deity hasn’t scripted your choices. Having your choices scripted makes you a puppet; merely having them predicted doesn’t. Likewise, being coerced, compelled, or manipulated threatens your freedom, whereas merely being necessitated by prior conditions doesn’t.
